KOZINSKI, Chief Judge:
Submission is vacated pending the Supreme Court’s disposition of Maloney v. Rice, No. 08-1592, McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1521, and National Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1497.
The Maui Planning Commission denied three petitions to intervene in the Grand Wailea Resort Hotel & Spa's $250 million expansion application Tuesday.The story reports that Mr. Hall (who, recall, represented Sierra Club et al in the Superferry case) sought intervention on behalf of three individuals - two who live near the project and a third, Hall's wife and former chair of the Maui/Lanai Island Burial Council, on the issue of Hawaiian burials. Hall asserted shoreline setback and environmental issues as well as the burial issue.
Isaac Hall, speaking for the petitioners, promised to appeal.
He read from a 2000 Hawaii Supreme Court decision in favor of Ka Pa'akai o ka Aina against the Land Use Commission in a Big Island urbanization case. The court said: "The past failure to require Native Hawaiian cultural impact assessments has resulted in the loss and destruction of many important cultural resources and has interfered with the exercise of Native Hawaiian culture."
This "seems like a very close parallel" to the present situation, he said.
Commissioner Bruce U'u, while acknowledging that the original excavations were not handled well, said that a cultural advisory board set up by the applicant would appropriately monitor the work, and that Dana Hall could participate through that.
Both Lyons Naone III and Kimokeo Kapahulehua had testified earlier that the hotel had appropriately included native cultural practitioners and other knowledgeable members of the community.
Much of the public testimony in favor of the hotel expansion focused on economic issues.
Iowa law requires property owners to pay for excavating a site for human remains, and [the developer] is seeking compensation for those costs, the relocation of the remains and the lost use of the site.
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Attorney Glenn Johnson, who represents [the order], said the nuns did not know the site still contained human remains. As part of the land's transfer, he said, the diocese was supposed to move the remains to another cemetery.
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[The discovery of remains] led to an excavation by the state archaeologist's office. Shirley Shermer, director of the state archaeologist's burials program, said there were remains of at least 600 bodies at the site, mostly in unmarked graves.
''In these old, historic cemeteries, if it is closed and no longer used, some of the graves are moved,'' she said. ''Sometimes, if the local belief is all the graves have been moved, more than likely only some of them have been moved.''
She said her office is about three-quarters of the way through its analysis of the remains. But unless other documentation surfaces, such as a map identifying the graves, it's unlikely the remains will ever be identified, Shermer said.
The remains, mostly fragments, will be reburied in a common burial vault at Mount Olivet Cemetery.
The Garden Island, has been following the story of a woman who was found in her driveway last August dead from an overdose of pills and alcohol. Although police eventually classified it an "unattended and accidental death," their attention was drawn to a former Kauai police officer against whom the deceased woman had recently filed a handwritten application for a restraining order.Former Kaua‘i Police Department officer Joseph G. Bonachita allegedly broke into the Wailua home of “South Park” creator Randolph “Trey” Parker and threatened both Parker and the late Lauren Kagawa with a knife, according to a grand jury indictment.
[T]he Judges’ Financial Statements are administrative records concerning the management of personnel and are, therefore, subject to disclosure under the UIPA.The court disagreed on separation of powers grounds and curtly responded that the records of Judicial Financial Disclosure Statements are “not mere administrative records concerning the management of personnel…subject to disclosure under UIPA.” Rather they are judicial records created and governed by Supreme Court rules promulgated under the court’s “inherent and constitutional judicial authority to regulate judges,” and are therefore not subject to OIP review.
The UIPA specifically defines “agency” to exclude “the non-administrative functions of the courts of this State.” Thus, the UIPA does not apply to records pertaining to or connected with the non-administrative functions of the courts.
OIP found that the Judges’ Financial Statements relate to the courts’ “executive,” i.e. “administrative,” functions of managing the conduct of Judiciary personnel and providing the public with access to such information. Accordingly, OIP concluded that the Judges’ Financial Statements are subject to disclosure under the UIPA and in accordance with OIP’s administrative rules.
In our tripartite system of government, judicial functions, such as promulgating rules and keeping records with regard to judicial qualification and discipline matters, are not subject to interference by an executive administrative agency.So there.
A. Solicit, accept or receive, directly or indirectly, any gift, whether in the form of money, service, loan, travel, entertainment, hospitality, thing or promise or in any other form, under circumstances in which it can reasonably be inferred that the gift is intended to influence him in the performance of his official duties or is intended as a reward for any official action on his part.
B. Disclose information which, by law or practice, is not available to the public and which he acquires in the course of his official duties or use such information for his personal gain or for the benefit of anyone.
C. Acquire financial interest in business enterprises which he may be directly involved in official action to be taken by him.
D. Appear in behalf of private interests before any county board, commission or agency.
E. Use his official position to secure a special benefit,
privilege or exemption for himself or others.
F. Use county property for other than public activity or purpose.
“That’s part of my job. I would not be performing what I was paid to do here at KEDB, which is to bring up certain matters before Planning (Commission) or council on behalf of KEDB and our membership,” Yoshioka said in a phone interview. “I would be derelict in my duties as president and CEO of KEDB if I was forbidden to do that.”
“Essentially I am (in violation), but for the benefit of the entire island of Kaua‘i,” [Ms. Yoshioka] said. “I think (the Board of Ethics) didn’t see that.”
Mrs. Foster first brought it to my attention yesterday noting that when she hovered over it with the mouse it did not provide an explanatory text box as it always has in the past. The oral charge in this case was insufficient. The charge failed to include a plain, concise and definite statement of each of the essential facts constituting the offense of OVUII because it failed to allege that Wheeler operated a vehicle on a public road, street or highway, an attendant circumstance of the offense. See HRPP Rules 5(b) and 7(a); HRS § 702-205; State v. Jendrusch, 58 Haw. 279, 567 P.2d 1242 (1977) (oral charge must sufficiently allege all of the essential elements of the offense charged; defective charge constitutes denial of due process). The District Court erred by denying Wheeler's motions. Inasmuch as the charge was defective, the District Court was without jurisdiction in this matter. See State v. Sprattling, 99 Hawai‘i 312, 327, 55 P.3d 276, 291 (2002).The state subsequently filed, and the Hawaii Supreme Court accepted, an application for writ of certiorari of the issue.
[W]e conclude that the charge was sufficient because the State need not allege that Anderson was traveling on a public way, street, road, or highway in order to convict him of violating [the OVUII statute].State v. Anderson, No. 29377 slip op. (Haw. App. Sep. 4, 2009)
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I [smell] it
The Circuit Court lawsuit was filed on behalf of three minor children who were repeatedly assaulted when in the care of Rita Makekau and Gabriel and Barbara Kalama.
The lawsuit alleges the state "acted negligently" when it approved the Kalamas as legal guardians.
The state also failed to monitor and oversee the condition of the children after they were placed in the Kalamas' care, the suit charged.
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DHS officials have previously said that once the Kalamas became legal guardians of the children, the state was no longer involved in their oversight.
In previous lawsuits involving child abuse, the state has denied liability if the victim was not in state custody when the abuse took place.
But in a ruling last year, the Hawai'i Supreme Court said the DHS has a duty to protect a child when given notice that the child has been a victim of abuse.
Last year, Koller strongly criticized the 2008 high court ruling and predicted that it would expose the state to costly legal claims.
"In effect, this decision means that whenever there is a bad outcome for a child ... the state will be held liable," Koller said. "While making the state pay as a 'deep pocket' is one way to get compensation for an injured child, it is unfair to Hawai'i's taxpayers and it is exasperating for our social workers, whose conduct may be condemned no matter what they do."
(1) the HRS § 662-2 private analog exception [to state sovereign immunity] is inapplicable to this case inasmuch as the [plaintiffs] have met the threshold requirement of showing the existence of an analogous situation recognized in this jurisdiction to impose liability; (2) the plain language of HRS chapter 587, read in conjunction with its attendant regulatory mandates and policies, imposed upon DHS - as the trial court so found - a duty to protect Minor under the circumstances of this case from further abuse; (3) the trial court, although incorrectly announcing the application of the Youngberg professional judgment standard of care, properly applied the well-established reasonable person standard of care to this case to conclude that DHS breached its duty of care to Minor; (4) in so concluding, the trial court did not err in recognizing the collateral estoppel effect of the family court's oral ruling concerning Minor's custody at the time of her April 16, 2001 injuries; and (5) the trial court did not commit any error in finding that DHS's breach was causally connected to Minor's April 16, 2001 injuries. We further hold that the trial court properly found DHS (1) liable to the [plaintiffs] for [negligent infliction of emotional distress] and (2) jointly and severally liable for the entire damages award, less the amount [the plaintiffs] received from the settlement with the health care providers. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's January 22, 2007 second amended judgment.)
